## 1NC

**Off**

**Interpretation –**

**Economic engagement means the plan must utilize solely economic means**

**Jakstaite, 10** - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics Volume 3, Number 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/V10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

**That means trade and aid in the form of loans or grants**

**Resnick, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” Vol. 54 No. 2, Political Science Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

**Economic engagement is distinct from diplomatic**

**Derrick 98** (Robert, Lieutenant Colonel US Army, “ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?,” 1998, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA342695>)

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an effective engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money is involved. Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation 12Status, financial aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others. Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals, the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself. Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global military engagement. They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic development."14 In addition to our presence overseas, our military engagement consists of a variety of military to military and political to military events. U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined exercises to improve cooperation and strengthen ties. Much of the peacetime efforts of the DOS and DOD are engagement. This is in the form of forward presence, regional exercises, and infrastructure construction projects. The engagement tools of three of our five instruments of our National Power: Military, Economic and Political, (Geographical and National Will being the other two), listed below in Figure 3, are a few examples of how the US uses these powers to stay engaged.

Military Diplomatic Economic

CJCS Exercises State Recognition Agcy for Intl Devi

Depl for Trng (DFT) Presidential Visits Econ Spt Fund (ESF)

Intl Mil Ed & Tr (IMET) Demarshe Fgn Mil Sales (FMS)

Counterdrug Spt (CD) Treaties & Health Aid

Mobile Tr Teams (MTT) Agreements

**It’s a limits disaster**

**Hayden 13** (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International Communication Program at American University's School of International Service. “Engagement” is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy Term.”, <http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-than-helpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/>

I think this tension is readily apparent in efforts to use social media for public diplomacy.Case in point – how does the use of Facebook or Twitter constitute engagement? Does the larger base of people who “Like” an embassy page indicate a successful campaign of engagement? Or, does it reflect a productive use of advertising techniques to recruit “likes,” while not necessarily providing the implied more meaningful connections that social networks can sustain? When an ambassador uses Twitter, does this constitute a robust effort to sustain dialogue with publics, or, does it represent a kind of performance that humanizes the chief of mission? I’m not suggesting one is better than the other. What I am saying is that there a few clear parameters for what constitutes “engagement.” In my research on US digital public diplomacy, I have heard a lot of critiques about what is being done from a practical standpoint, but not so much on the bigger question of “why.” What does this mean for practitioners?¶ For starters, it makes it harder to design the kind of formative research needed to plan an effective public diplomacy program that takes into account both the contextual factors and the strategic needs that the program will serve. The conceptual ambiguity also makes it difficult to pin down how and when a program can be deemed effective in post hoc evaluation.¶ While I readily acknowledge that measurement and evaluation imperatives can ultimately distort the practice of public diplomacy or even conceal the less democratic forms of communication involved in public diplomacy outreach, I think it’s also important to acknowledge that the ambiguity of a term like “engagement” makes it potentially about everything – all the touch-points, communications, and connections that are involved in public diplomacy. I don’t think this helps practitioners, policy-makers, or commentators. Instead, it perpetuates jargon, and elides more persistent questions about both the purpose and the operative theories that underscore efforts to reach foreign publics.

**Wrecks precision**

**Resnick, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.

**Off**

**The affirmative’s discourse of American exceptionalism creates a system of manichaeistic domination**

**Porotsky 13** (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

In Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric, Joanne Esch contends that mythical discourse imbues language with power (Esch, 2010: 357). This follows the argument put forth by the previous authors mentioned, and stresses that threats are discursively constructed and intended to manufacture public consent for government policies. Esch defines political myth in terms of “Bottici’s (2007) philosophical understanding of political myth as a process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in significance” (Esch, 2010: 357). This is in direct correlation to the tenets of securitzation theory, as it adds depth to an understanding of the various devices used in the rhetorical representation of threats. As Esch elaborates, “three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a simple narrative: First a mythical narrative provides significance. Second it is shared by a group and (re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions of the group” (Esch, 2010: 362). The deployment of mythical discourse in political rhetoric is instrumental to identifying the mechanisms influencing public opinion, and informs my discourse analysis by outlining two prominent political myths in American political discourse: American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism. These myths are particularly powerful “because they have been tools of moral justification for military violence since the Declaration of Independence” (Esch, 2010: 365). The political myth of American Exceptionalism “consists of three ideas: America is a ‘chosen nation,’ America has a ‘calling’ or ‘mission,’ and in answering that calling, America represents the forces of good against evil” (Esch, 2010: 366). These ideas are embedded throughout the government texts, and are powerful indicators of moral justifications derived from the myth of American Exceptionalism. The myth of Civilization vs. Barbarism “relates to national identity and tells of the good nature and character of Americans vis à vis the ‘evil Other’…This myth is a classic story of ‘Us versus Them’ that favors cultural or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones” (Esch, 2010: 370). It becomes apparent how this myth can be utilized to obscure enemy grievances, while simultaneously dehumanizing them by denying them qualities of ‘civilized’ people. Esch accentuates the power of these myths, precisely because they are often invisible yet ubiquitous (Esch, 2010: 357). During my discourse analysis of Bush texts, I found that nearly every third sentence contained language linked to one of these political myths. Esch argues that these political myths were staples in the “War on Terror” discourse, and that political elites have “rhetorically accessed these mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of the ‘War on Terror’” (Esch, 2010: 357). Esch provides an important piece of the puzzle in answering the question of how the administration was able to use the threats it constructed to justify its actions: actions which amounted to a preventive war, unprecedented executive power, and very questionable human rights practices.

**This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis**

**Krause and Williams 97** (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

**Econ Primacy**

**Solvency deficit – work visas are key but the plan is not (GREEN)**

**Wilson, 1AC Author, 11** – Christopher E. Wilson, Program Associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, where he focuses on U.S.-Mexico economic integration and border issues. He previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and has also worked with the Center for North American Studies at American University and IQOM, Inteligencia Comericial, in Mexico City. Christopher completed his M.A. in International Affairs at American University, Mexico institute, Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars, “Mexico Institute Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico,” [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working%20Together%20Full%20Document.pdf//BG](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working%20Together%20Full%20Document.pdf/BG)HS-IS-OKIGUESS

As the baby boom generation begins to hit retirement age, the U.S. faces a demographic challenge. For the next several years, the number of nonworking seniors and youth that each working-age American must support will ¶ increase. As a result, a growing share of both personal and national income will have to be dedicated to the needs, including costly medical care, of an aging population. Mexico, on the other hand, still has a younger population. In fact, Mexico ¶ is entering what is known as **a demographic window**, a **limited period of time** when the working-age population is particularly large compared to dependents. This situation, **normally occurring just once** in the development of a society ¶ as declining birth rates lead to a demographic transition, **provides a unique** structural opportunity for **high rates of economic growth**. Many would suggest ¶ a comparison between the U.S. and Mexican population pyramids presents a ¶ strong argument for increasing the number of **work-related visas** available for legal ¶ immigration into the U.S., which would help fund programs like Medicare and ¶ Social Security while at the same time decreasing unauthorized immigration. But ¶ even if one opposes such an idea, increasing trade and economic cooperation with Mexico could offer pathways to capitalize on Mexico’s **favorable demographics** that do not involve migration.

**Competitiveness not key to heg**

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 8**

[Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “World out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy,” p. 32-35]

American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United States remains dominant globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial innovation, and higher education (table 2.3). Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the middle of the first decade of this century. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan's challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system's structure: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24

Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In fact, it confronts a number of significant vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that adverse trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long view of U.S. competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic and technological dominance, one takeaway stands out: relative power shifts slowly. The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global output for over a century. No other economy will match its combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3).

The depth, scale, and projected longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are noteworthy. But what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading powers is that nothing remotely similar ever occurred in the historical experience that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and underappreciated: the counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section explains why.

**No workforce crisis**

**Hosek**, National Defense Research Institute at RAND, PhD Economics @ Chicago, **‘8**

(James, and Titus Galama, “U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology,” <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG674.pdf>)

We consider two indicators of shortage—unusually low unemployment and high wage growth for scientists and engineers—and we make comparisons relative to past trends within science and engineering and relative to other high-skill occupations. These are only broad indicators. There may be no broad evidence of a shortage, yet a shortage could be present at a micro-level—for instance, at a particular moment a firm can have difficulty finding enough qualified engineers to meet its hiring requirements. If micro-level shortages were widely present and persistent, they would result in lower unemployment and faster wage growth, as firms adjusted their hiring standards and wage offers.

The unemployment rate has been the same in S&E occupations as in non-S&E occupations, except during the 1991 recession and the years following the end of the dot.com boom at the end of the 1990s, when the S&E unemployment rate was higher (see Figure 3.17). The greater cyclical sensitivity of S&E unemployment in 1991 and the early 2000s deserves further investigation, but it might be related to the rapid expansion in employment that occurred in information technology (see below). Workers not educated in S&E may have entered occupations classified as “computer science” or “information technology” and been counted as S&E workers, yet were more expendable by firms hit hard by the downturn.

Figure 3.18 presents a three-year moving average of the median salary from 1989 to 2004 for workers with at least a bachelor’s degree, with separate trend lines for scientists and engineers, lawyers, doctors and other non-S&E occupations. Doctors, lawyers, and many scientists and engineers have a professional degree or a doctorate in addition to a bachelor’s degree, so it is not surprising that their median salaries are higher than for other non-S&E occupations. But the figure is useful in showing the change in median salary over time, where we find average annual increases of 1.8 percent for doctors and 0.8 percent for lawyers compared with 0.9 percent for scientists and engineers, over 1995 to 2005. Salaries in non-S&E occupations excluding lawyers and medical doctors grew at only 0.3 percent per year. In sum, unemployment and wage growth patterns are thus not unusual and do not point to the presence of a chronic or cyclical shortage in S&E. Indeed, Trivedi (2006) argues that there is an oversupply of PhDs in the life sciences.

**No impact to heg**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**Khalilzad’s theories are wrong**

**Nashashibi, 3** (Isaam M. Nashashibi, Frequent Writer on Arab Issues, US-Based Director of Deir Yassin; Remembered, “The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”, Counterpunch, 4/17/2003, http://www.counterpunch.org/issam04172003.html)

His many critics point out, however, that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been right-going back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. "If he was in private business rather than government," said Anatol Lieven, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, "he would have been sacked long ago."

**His views are single minded**

**Nashashibi, 3** (Isaam M. Nashashibi, Frequent Writer on Arab Issues, US-Based Director of Deir Yassin; Remembered, “The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”, Counterpunch, 4/17/2003, http://www.counterpunch.org/issam04172003.html)

More importantly, perhaps, Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia," his former associate stressed. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. He tends to look at military solutions as the first, not the last policy option."

**The affirmative’s economic nationalism makes possible the sacrifice of populations deemed impure**

**Whyte 7** – PHD and reader in Sociology at the University of Liverpool School of Sociology and Social policy (Dave Whyte, “Market Patriotism and the "War on Terror"”, in Social Justice, vol 34 iss 3/4, Proquest)

It is doubtful whether neoconservatism represents a break from neoliberalism that is significant enough to distinguish the two perspectives within the power bloc. An intrinsic incompatibility is not expressed if, for example, the ideal of the (laissez-faire) state is conceptualized differently in Chicago School economic theory (in which the state's proper role is reduced to maintaining a rudimentary system of rules that can guarantee access to "free" markets) and Straussian political philosophy (which stresses the requirement of a nationally cohesive authoritarian state-led by a beneficial tyranny-that must establish a solid moral order and ensure the defense of Western civilization). The relationship between the two positions is revealing in that the chief intellectuals identified with the neocons (e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol), though they frequently disagree in public on matters of philosophy and policy, are united by their enthusiasm for neoliberal economics. Giving continuity to the U.S. ruling class is a belief in a neoliberal market standard of civilization and in the leading role of the U.S. in securing this standard of civilization, by force if necessary. The more brutal and coercive form of capitalist rule that is currently being reconfigured, then, is less concerned with liberal tropes of prosperity, representation, and freedom than with asserting a universal (neoliberal) market standard of civilization. Since the birth of the U.S. state, the central legitimating myth has been the assumption that the U.S. had adopted the mantle of the guardian of Western civilization. The genocides of indigenous populations that enabled European colonization of the Americas, particularly in North America, were committed with reference to a "chosen people" mythology derived from the Christian Bible. Central to this mythology is the idea that the U.S. inherited from the Europeans the guardianship of Western civilization. As Amin (2004: 63) notes, "thereafter, the United States extended to the whole planet its project of realizing the work that 'God' had commanded it to carry out." The chosen-people myth formed the basis of the Manifest Destiny doctrine; it was particularly influential in the post-World War II period, especially in George Kennan's writings. Recent neocon texts express this view, by contrasting the willingness with which the U.S. defends Western civilization with the spinelessness of "old" Europe (see Kagan, 2003). The core legitimating narrative for U.S. imperialism, then, is the claim that the U.S. is uniquely placed to guarantee peace and stability, and to provide leadership for the weak, backward, wayward rest of the world; this "chosen people" myth allows the U.S. to stake claims to global economic leadership and American exceptionalism (Said, 1993: 343-349). The program first set out by the neocon pressure group-the Project for the New American Century-has now been fully realized in Afghanistan and Iraq and has taken American exceptionalism to new heights. seeking to use a full complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts to preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles,"2 the program represents a profoundly nationalist stance that expresses U.S. preemptive strategy in terms derived from a "chosen people" myth. Legitimacy for U.S. global hegemony at this juncture is based upon a patriotism that reasserts the U.S. as the guardian of Western civilization. Two features of hegemonic rule, the economy and nationhood, characterize the political moment at the heart of the Imperium that is often "blamed" upon a neocon cabal. It is the neoliberal economic doctrine, wedded to a strengthening of patriotic allegiances to the United States. This moment of political leadership in the U.S. invokes loyalty to the nation-state as an explicit means of strengthening a particular form of market capitalism and uses the market to strengthen allegiance to particularly violent and authoritarian forms of state power. It seeks a commitment to supporting the coercive responses of national states and the uninterrupted progress of the global market as twin bulwarks against terrorism.

**Aging Crisis**

**Empirics prove democratic states still go to war**

**Rosato 11**

Sebastian, Dept of Political Science at Notre Dame. “The Handbook on the Political Economy of War”, Google Books

Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet his suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United States was not a state but a union of states, and lhat this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim. The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993, pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal slate prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that are currently coded as having been 'liberal\* during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle\*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out, foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mearsheimer 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an important exception to the finding.

**The fear of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”**

**Gomel 2000** (Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

**No extinction**

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

**Representations of China as a threat ignore the normative value-judgments inherent to the process of claiming to empirically know Chinese national and political identity—this makes security threats self-fulfilling prophecies**

**Pan, 4** – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives RC)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means**.** For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.

**No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out**

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. **Shlapak**, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200**7**

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

**Discourse of Russian threats Otherize Russia and actualizes itself**

**JÆGER 2000** (Øyvind, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” Peace and Conflict Studies, November, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf)

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15 The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threatdefence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994: 8)16 puts it: "Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside". To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or postmodern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows.

**US-Russia war would end in peace negotiations before nukes were launched – Russian generals concede.**

**Ivashov, 2007**

Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. July 2007 “WILL AMERICA FIGHT RUSSIA”. Defense and Security, No 78. LN

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. **Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation**. **An ultimatum will be sent to Russia**: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. **Russia will refuse and its objects** (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) **will be wiped out by guided missiles** with conventional warheads **and** by **aviation**. Once this phase is over, **an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented** - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. **Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike** at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. **NATO armies will invade** Belarus and western Russia. **Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum** through the use of some device that will help it save face. **The acceptance will be followed by talks** over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, **and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin** to the United States **that** **continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.**

## 2NC

### \*\*T

### AT: W/M

The United States federal government should develop a Medicare insurance program with the Mexican Ministry of Health for American citizens living in Mexico.

**Engagement should be defined as the means, not an end – it’s necessary for education and effective policy analysis**

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO NARROWLY The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly circumscribe the parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define engagement as ends rather than means; stipulate the types of states that can engage or be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement. Each of these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative to other policies objectively accurately. Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."(n17) Such ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of policymaking consists of selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different means, policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less effective.(n18) Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes. This is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal, scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is ineffective.(n19) Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts to more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in achieving an array of ends.

### \*\*K

### FW

**Framework**

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

**4. Their framework causes passivity**

**Antonio 95** (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

Their framework destroys agency and makes violence inevitable

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

`We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all**,** any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what *I could* do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### A2: Util

**Utilitarian calculability makes annihilation of everything inevitable**

**Dillon 99** – (Michael, professor of political science at the University of Lancaster, Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pg 163- 164 jstor)

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular herme- neutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, how- ever, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logi- cally, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. How- ever liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the neces- sity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

### AT

### Link

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination

and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

## 1NR

### Heg

**Hegemony never existed – system is de-centralized, applying hegemonic mythology to policy causes blowback and destroys cooperation**

**Doran, 09** (Charles F., Andrew W. Mellon Prof. of International Relations, Director of the Global Theory and History Program, Director of the Center for Canadian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U., “Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony” International Studies Review, Vol. 11.1)

More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United States? Building on the guidelines proposed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the very notion of hegemony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that the current conception of hegemony has neither historical nor theoretical justification (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here bear witness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role. Historically, as Doran (1971) argued, all military attempts at hegemonic domination in the central system failed; other members of the system rolled back these bids for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent peace was neither designed nor governed (Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single state. Hegemony therefore involved *attempts* at c/entralized control, but never realized control. Instead, equilibrium among highly unequal states (Kissinger 2005) preserved the de-centralized nature of the international system (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system never existed. The central international system is pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the rules of balance. Across long periods of history, the structure of the system changes as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power, reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, states are located at highly unequal positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, has never dominated and controlled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. The United States is an “ordinary power” (Rosecrance 1976) like others, just more powerful, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the system. The choice of “global leadership” is far different from that of “global domination” (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in *Hegemony Constrained* provide strong evidence in support of the claim that the reason a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), hegemony does not exist except in the minds of a few theorists of international relations and influential advocates in policy circles. Not unexpectedly, other governments have discovered tactics to elude and to minimize the effect of such applications within US foreign policy. The excesses of application in the George W. Bush administration are the outcome of a mythology long in the making, extending from E.H. Carr’s extrapolation from British colonialism, and nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state defeats and replaces the prior hegemon in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996;Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that unipolarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed “the biggest bulldog on the block”). Quite in contrast is the argumentation of all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration, a time when America enjoyed greater relative power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those existing today. Yet, led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought (Krauthamer 1991;Mastanduno 1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic thesis that they have blinded themselves to the consequences of their own speculation. Should they be surprised when the “hierarchy” of international relations turns out to be non-existent, or the capacity to control even very weak and divided polities is met with frustration? Americans have invented a mythology of hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find themselves in that they cannot comprehend the responses of other governments to their actions. Bobrow and his fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and fulminations emanating from Washington. By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than learning to work with the (properly conceived) balance of power, the United States has complicated its foreign policy and vastly raised the costs of its operation (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian penetration of Latin America. By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States finds that very few other governments see the need to assist it, because hegemony is supposed to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.

### Econ Rationality

Their impacts rely on the concept of the homo calculan – this creates a sadistic necro-economy that makes their impacts inevitable and turns us into slaves

Bifo 11 (Franco Berardi is an is Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism, After the Future , 09/20/11, <http://www.sok.bz/web/media/video/AfterFuture.pdf>, [JJ])

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality.¶ Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the¶ problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went¶ wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the¶ Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists¶ the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned,¶ because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market.¶ And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic¶ theology of neoliberalism.¶ But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is¶ an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed¶ to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and¶ perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social¶ action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the¶ conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an¶ attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault¶ (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The¶ Birth of Biopolitics.¶ This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced¶ cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon¶ flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not¶ perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of¶ financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field.¶ This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of¶ economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two¶ centuries.¶ Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis¶ of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the¶ psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire¶ and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word¶ “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist.¶ The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that¶ exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.¶ Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic¶ discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls¶ under the domination of capitalist rule.¶ The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic¶ description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a¶ technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a¶ narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: ¶ Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and¶ perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything¶ within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the¶ Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows¶ itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value,¶ bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity,¶ demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to¶ behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold¶ the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of¶ psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks,¶ investments and losses. (Sordello 1983)¶ From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a¶ process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were¶ intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people¶ who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to¶ become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on¶ the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique¶ of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human¶ beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented¶ activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time¶ itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and¶ body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth¶ is making scarce both water and air.¶ Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of¶ producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx¶ did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of¶ economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies¶ richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to¶ the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried¶ work. ¶ In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very¶ foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of¶ material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the¶ Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic¶ categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. ¶ The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of¶ John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be¶ privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple.¶ But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without¶ cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process,¶ the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and¶ it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary,¶ the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product,¶ is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it¶ almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time¶ and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able¶ to determine price and salary.¶ The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide¶ deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational¶ expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a¶ lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global¶ capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund¶ and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of¶ the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the¶ market is militarily regulated.¶ The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect¶ knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect¶ rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has¶ finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The¶ theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic¶ agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best¶ deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies¶ has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the¶ theoretical swindle. ¶ Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational¶ factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading¶ information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional¶ tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. ¶ The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has¶ the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural¶ law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in¶ control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power¶ has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to¶ recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times¶ on September 6th 2009:¶ After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks¶ began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may¶ have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance¶ policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life¶ expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies,¶ in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds.¶ They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will¶ receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the¶ policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than¶ expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money.¶ Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would¶ absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay¶ the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I¶ 113die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the¶ insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t¶ need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story:¶ financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. ¶ The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not¶ new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides.¶ But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the¶ investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure.¶ The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was¶ dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the¶ transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the¶ subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life¶ with future money that will never come, because death will come before.¶ The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad:¶ neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their¶ speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political¶ class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to¶ protect society from the final assault.¶ In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when¶ the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”.¶ Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of¶ the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of¶ political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The¶ economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists¶ have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of¶ growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles¶ have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

### Predictions

Linearity fails

Bernstein et al 2000 Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that **the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought**, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for *predictive* theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. *Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model* Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about *trillions* of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.** Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples** of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. **Even when all the underlying conditions are present**, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors.** Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing** what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**.

Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it **very hard to access that information reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; **that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs.** We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the **values** and **behavioral repertories** of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. *Any* regularities would be 'soft'; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy* The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori* from the causal statement itself. Nor will **complete** **knowledge** (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily **allow us to project its future course of development.** In a practical sense, **all social systems** (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). **As physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

### Aging Crisis

Their aging crisis impact creates an economy of ageist and racist victimization

Gee 2 (Ellen M Gee, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University, 2002, “Misconceptions and misapprehensions about population ageing,” <http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/4/750.full#sec-1>) gz

As a preface, it is useful to recognize the historical precedence for demographic scapegoating in the 20th century, i.e. the blaming of social ills/problems on demographic phenomena. As I have discussed elsewhere,9 two examples provide evidence of earlier demographic alarmism. One example is the eugenics movement that focussed on reproductive control as a way to preserve and improve the White race. In Canada, attempts were made to lower the fertility of non-Whites and less socially-desirable Whites (eastern Europeans, for the most part) in the early part of the 20th century; the most egregious being the forced sterilization of people deemed to be ‘unfit’, a highly disproportionate number of whom were of Aboriginal origins.10 Coupled with negative views about the higher fertility of the non-Anglo origin population were concerns about the unsuitability of immigrants of non-western European origins, concerns that culminated in the passing of the Oriental Exclusion Act in the 1920s (similar legislation was put into effect in the US at the same time). Thus, as North America was wrought with the social and economic changes associated with industrialization and modernization, fertility and migration (two key demographic processes) were being used in an attempt to preserve an earlier version of society.¶ A second example of demographic alarmism is the formulation of the ‘population bomb’ in the decades following World War II. While it is true that population grew rapidly in the South at this time, it was the North that defined this growth as a ‘bomb’—a crisis of huge proportions. A massive infusion of western (largely US) money was put into the birth control movement, based on the simplistic notion that technology (i.e. methods of birth control) would lower the number of children that southern women would have and on the assumption that lowered rates of population growth would stimulate economic growth. The birth control movement failed, in the sense that fertility was not significantly lowered; I remember hearing John Rockefeller—one of its major leaders—declare its failure in a very crowded and tension-filled auditorium at the 1974 World Population Meeting in Bucharest. However, when one recognizes that the US political motivation behind birth control expenditures in the South was the exertion of western influence on uncommitted countries of the Third World that could have been attracted to Soviet development models, the birth control movement did succeed on one level.¶ These examples may seem far from the topic of population ageing, but they are instructive in showing that demography can be, and has been, used to reconstruct and redefine social problems in ways that fit a political agenda or, at the least, that calibrate with current and popular ideological positions. One reason for this is that demographic phenomenon and projections are viewed as having a ‘scientific’ certainty that is not subject to question.